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Abstract
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that formalizes the constructive pref-
erence perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we explore an extention of
the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making. A 2X2 game is investigated. We first show
that in a one-shot simultaneaous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to a standard incomplete
information model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise exchange game. We
show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have impact on next following be-
havior when the standard classical model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs
from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the
intrinsic indeterminacy of the players’ type.
Keywords: quantum indeterminacy, type, strategic decision-making, game
1 Introduction
This paper belongs to a very recent and rapidly growing literature where formal tools of Quantum
Mechanics are proposed to explain a variety of behavioral anomalies in social sciences and in psychology
(see e.g. [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19, 20]).
∗Indiana University, jbusemey@indiana.edu
†Paris School of Economics, alambert@pse.ens.fr
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The use of quantum formalism in game theory was initiated by Eisert et al. [9] who propose that
models of quantum games can be used to study how the extension of classical moves to quantum ones can
affect the analysis of a game.1 Another example is La Mura [18] who investigates correlated equilibria
with quantum signals in classical games. In this paper we introduce some features of an extension of the
Type Indeterminacy (TI) model of decision-making [17] from simple decisions to strategic decisions. The
TI-model has been proposed as a theoretical framework for modelling the KT(Kahneman–Tversky)–man,
i.e., for the ”constructive preference perspective”.2 Extending the TI-model to strategic decision-making
is a rather challenging task. Here we explore some central issues in an example while the basic concepts
and solutions are developed in a companion paper. More precisely we investigate, in two different settings,
a 2x2 game with options, to cooperate and to defect and we refer to it as a Prisoner Dilemma, PD3. In
the first setting, the players move simultaneously and the game is played once. In the second setting, the
simultaneous move PD game is preceded by a promise exchange game. Our aim is to illustrate how the TI
approach can provide an explanation as to why cheap talk promises matter.4 There exists a substantial
literature on cheap talk communication games (see for instance [16] for a survey). The approach in our
paper does not belong to the literature on communication games. The cheap talk promise exchange stage
is used to illustrate the possible impact of pre-play interaction. Various behavioral theories have also
been proposed to explain the impact of cheap talk promises when standard theory predicts that there is
none. They most often rely on very specific assumptions amounting to adding ad-hoc elements to the
utility function (a moral cost for breaking promises) or emotional communication [12]. Our approach
provides an explanation relying on a fundamental structure of the model i.e., the quantum indeterminacy
of players’ type. An advantage of our approach is that the type indeterminacy hypothesis also explains
a variety of other so called behavioral anomalies such as framing effects, cognitive dissonance [17], the
disjunction effect [3] or the inverse fallacy [11].
A main interest with TI-game is that the Type Indeterminacy hypothesis can modify quite significantly
the way we think about games. Indeed, a major implication of the TI-hypothesis is to extend the field of
strategic interactions. This is because actions impact not only on the payoffs but also on the profile of
types, i.e., on who the players are. In a TI-model, players do not have a well-determined (exogenously
given) type. Instead players’ types change along the game together with the chosen actions (which are
1From a game-theoretical point of view the approach consists in changing the strategy spaces, and thus the interest of
the results lies in the appeal of these changes.
2“There is a growing body of evidence that supports an alternative conception according to which preferences are often
constructed – not merely revealed – in the elicitation process. These constructions are contingent on the framing of the
problem, the method of elicitation, and the context of the choice”. (Kahneman and Tversky 2000).
3This is for convenience, as we shall see that the game is not perceived as a true PD by all possible types of a player.
4Cheap talk promises are promises that can be broken at no cost.
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modelled as the outcome of a measurement of the type). We provide an example showing that an initially
non-cooperative player can be (on average) turned into a rather cooperative one by confronting him with
a tough player in a cheap talk promise exchange game.
Not surprisingly we find that there exists no distinction in terms of predictions between the standard
Bayes-Harsanyi and the Type Indeterminacy approaches in a simultaneous move context. But in a
multi-stage context where the interaction at two different stages correspond to non-commuting Game
Situations5 a move with no informational content or payoff relevance may still impact on the outcome of
the game.
2 A TI-model of strategic decision-making
In the TI-model a simple decision situation is represented by an observable6 called a DS. A decision-maker
is represented by his state or type. A type is a vector |ti〉 in a Hilbert space. The measurement of the
observable corresponds to the act of choosing. Its outcome, the chosen item, actualizes an eigentype7 of
the observable (or a superposition8 of eigentypes if the measurement is coarse). It is information about
the preferences (type) of the agent. For instance consider a model where the agent has preferences over
sets of three items, i.e. he can rank any 3 items from the most preferred to the least preferred. Any
choice experiment involving three items is associated with six eigentypes corresponding to the six possible
rankings of the items. If the agent chooses a out of {a, b, c} his type is projected onto some superposition
of the rankings [a > b > c] and [a > c > b] . The act of choosing is modelled as a measurement of the
(preference) type of the agent and it impacts on the type i.e., it changes it (for a detailed exposition
of the TI-model see [17]). How does this simple scheme change when we are dealing with strategic
decision-making?
We denote by GS (for Game Situation) an observable that measures the type of an agent in a strategic
situation, i.e., in a situation where the outcome of the choice, in terms of the agent’s utility, depends
on the choice of other agents as well. The interpretation of the outcome of the measurement is that the
chosen action is a best reply against the opponents’ expected action9. This interpretation parallels the
5A Game Situation is an operator that measures the type of a player, see below.
6An observable is a linear operator.
7The eigentypes are the types associate with the eigenvalues of the observable i.e., the possible outcomes of the mea-
surement of the DS.
8A superposition is a linear combination of the form
P
λi |ti〉 ;
P
λ
2
i
= 1.
9Note that a GS is thus defined conditionnaly on the opponent’s type. In our companion paper we use the concept of
GO or Game Operator, a complete collection of (commuting) GS (each defined for a specific opponent). The outcome of a
GO is an eigentype of the game, it gives information about how a player plays against any possible opponent in a specific
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one in the simple decision context. There, we interpret the chosen item as the preferred one in accordance
with an underlying assumption of rationality i.e., the agent maximizes his utility (he chooses what he
prefers). The notion of revealed preferences (we shall use the term actualized rather than revealed10)
and a fortiori of actualized best-reply is problematic however. A main issue here is that a best reply is a
response to an expected play. When the expected play involves subjective beliefs there may be a problem
as to the measurability of the preferences. This is in particular so if subjective beliefs are quantum
properties.11 But in the present context of maximal information games (see below for precise definition)
we are dealing objective probabilities so it is warranted to talk about actualized best-reply.
TI-games are games with type indeterminate players, i.e., games characterized by uncertainty. In
particular, players do not know the payoff of other players. The standard (classical) approach to incom-
plete information in games is due to Harsanyi. It amounts to transforming the game into a game of
imperfect information where Nature moves at the beginning of the game and selects, for each player, one
among a multiplicity of possible types (payoff functions). A player’s own type is his private information.
But in a TI-game the players may not even know their own payoff. This is true even in TI-game of
maximal information where the initial types are pure types.12 Can the Harsanyi approach be extended
to TI-games? We shall argue that the TI-paradigm gives new content to Harsanyi’s approach. What is
a fictitious Nature’s move in Harsanyi’s setting becomes a real move (a measurement) with substantial
implications. And the theoretical multiplicity of types of a player becomes a real multiplicity of ”selves”.
Types and eigentypes We use the term type to refer to the quantum pure state of a player. A pure
type is maximal information about the player i.e., about his payoff function. But because of (intrinsic)
indeterminacy, the type is not complete information about the payoff function in all games simultaneously
not even to the player himself (see ?? for a systematic investigation of non-classical indeterminacy with
application to social sciences).
In a TI-game we also speak about the eigentypes of any specific game M , these are complete infor-
game.
10The expression revealed preferences implicitely assumes that the prefrences pre-existed the measurement and that
they are uncovered by the measurement. A central feature of the TI-model is precisely to depart from that assumption.
Preferences do not pre-exist the measurement. Preferences are in a state of potentials that can be actualized by the
measurement.
11If subjective beliefs and preferences are quantum properties that do not commute then they cannot be measured
simultaneously.
12Pure types provide maximal information about a player. But in a context of indeterminacy, there is an irreducible
uncertainty. It is impossible to know all the type characteristics of a player with certainty. For a discussion about pure and
mixed types see Section 3.2 in [6].
4
mation about the payoff functions in a specific static game M . Any eigentype of a player knows his own
M -game payoff function but he may not know that of the other players. The eigentypes of a TI-game M
are identified with their payoff function in that game.
So we see that while the Harsanyi approach only uses a single concept, i.e., that of type and it
is identified both with the payoff function and with the player. In any specific TI-game M we must
distinguish between the type which is identified with the player and the eigentypes (of M) which are
identified with the payoff functions in game M . A helpful analogy is with multiple-selves models (see
e.g., [21] and [13]). In multiple-selves models, we are most often dealing with two ”levels of identity”.
These two levels are identified with short-run impulsive selves on the one side and a long-run ”rational
self” on the other side. In our context we have two levels as well: the level of the player (the type) and
the level of the selves (the eigentypes) which are to be viewed as potential incarnations of the player in
a specific game.
A central assumption that we make is that the reasoning leading to the determination of the best-reply
is performed at the level of the eigentypes of the game. This key assumption deserves some clarification.
What we do is to propose that players are involved in some form of parallel reasoning: all the active (with
non-zero coefficient of superposition) eigentypes perform their own strategic thinking. Another way to
put it is that we assume that the player is able to reason from different perspectives. Note that this is not
as demanding as it may at first appear. Indeed we are used in standard game theory to the assumption
that players are able to put themselves ”in the skin” of other players to think out how those will play in
order to be able to best-respond to that.
As in the basic TI-model, the outcome of the act of choosing, here a move, is information about the
(actualized) type of the player and the act of choosing modifies the type of the player e.g., from some
initial superposition it ”collapses” onto a specific eigentype of the game under consideration (see next
section for concrete examples).
Finally, we assume that each player is an independent system i.e., there is no entanglement between
players.13
We next investigate an example of a maximal information two-person game. The objective is to
introduce some basic features of TI-games in a simple context and to illustrate an equivalence and some
distinctions between the Bayes-Harsanyi approach and the TI-approach.
13In future research we intend to investigate the possibility of entanglement between players.
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2.1 A single interaction
Consider a 2X2 symmetric game, M, and for concreteness we call the two possible actions cooperate
(C) and defect (D) (as in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game but as we shall see below for certain types, it is a
coordination game) and we define the preference types of gameM also called the M-eigentypes as follows:
θ1 : prefers to cooperate whatever he expects the opponent to do;
θ2 : prefers to cooperate if he expects the opponent to cooperate with probability p > q (for some
q ≤ 1) otherwise he prefers to defect;
θ3 : prefers to defect whatever he expects the opponent to do.
An example of these types is in the payoff matrices below where we depict the row player’s payoff:
θ1 :

C D
C 10 5
D 0 0
 , θ2 :

C D
C 10 0
D 6 8
 , θ2 :

C D
C 0 0
D 10 5

We shall now proceed to investigate this simultaneous move TI-game. We note immediately that θ1
and θ3 are non-strategic while θ2 is, i.e., his best-reply will depend on what he expects the opponent
to do. The initial types are generally not eigentypes of the game under consideration. Let player 1 be
described by the superposition
|t1〉 = λ1 |θ1〉+ λ2 |θ2〉+ λ3 |θ3〉 ,
∑
λ2i = 1.
14 (1)
We shall first be interested in the optimal play of player 1 when he interacts with a player 2 of different
eigentypes. Suppose he interacts with a player 2 of eigentype θ1. Using the definitions of the eigentypes
θi above and (1), we know by Born’s rule
15 that with probability λ21 + λ
2
2 player 1 plays C (because θ2’s
best-reply to θ1 is C ) and he collapses on the (superposed) type |t′1〉 = λ1√λ2
1
+λ2
2
|θ1〉+ λ2√
λ2
1
+λ2
2
|θ2〉 . With
probability λ23 player 1 playsD and collapses on the eigentype θ3. If instead player 1 interacts with a player
2 of type θ3 then with probability λ
2
1 he plays C and collapses on the eigentype θ1 and since θ
′
2s best-reply
to θ3 is D, with probability λ
2
2 + λ
2
3 he plays D and collapses on type |t”1〉= λ2√λ2
3
+λ2
2
|θ2〉+ λ3√
λ2
3
+λ2
2
|θ3〉 .
We note that the probabilities for player 1’s moves depends on the opponent’s type and corresponding
expected play - as usual. More interesting is that, as a consequence, the resulting type of player 1 also
depends on the type of the opponent. This is because in a TI-model the act of choice is a measurement
that operates on the type and changes it. We interpret the resulting type as the initial type modified
15The calculus of probability in Quantum Mechanics is defined by Born’s rule according to which the probability for the
different eigentypes is given by the square of the coefficients of superposition.
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by the measurement. In a one-shot context, this is just an interpretation since formally it cannot be
distinguished from a classical informational interpretation where the resulting type captures our revised
beliefs about player 1 (when our initial beliefs are given by (1).
We now consider a case when player 2’s type is indeterminate as well:
|t2〉 = γ1 |θ1〉+ γ2 |θ2〉+ γ3 |θ3〉 ,
∑
γ2i = 1. (2)
From the point of view of the eigentypes of a player (the θi), the situation can be analyzed as a
standard situation of incomplete information. We consider two examples:
Example 1 Let λ21 ≥ q, implying that the eigentype θ2 of player 2 cooperates and let γ21 + γ22 ≥ q so the
eigentype θ2 of player 1 cooperates as well.
Example 2 Let λ21 ≥ q so the eigentype θ2 of player 2 cooperates but now let γ21 + γ22 < q so here the
eigentype θ2 of player 1 prefers to defect.
In Example 1 the types θ1 and θ2 of both players pool to cooperate. So in particular player 1’s
resulting type is a superposition of |θ1〉 and |θ2〉 with probability
(
λ21 + λ
2
2
)
and it is the eigentype |θ3〉
with probability λ23. In Example 2, player 1’s eigentypes θ2 and θ3 pool to defect so player 1’s resulting
type is a superposition of |θ2〉 and |θ3〉 with probability λ22 + λ23 and |θ1〉 with probability λ21. So we see
again how the resulting type of player 1 varies with the initial (here superposed) type of his opponent.
Definition
A pure static TI-equilibrium of a game M with action set A = {a1, a2} and strategy sets S 1 = S2 =
S and initial types
(∣∣tt=01 〉 , ∣∣tt=02 〉)is
i. A profile of pure strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ S × S such that each one of the M−eigentypes of each player
maximizes his expected utility given the (superposed) type of his opponent and the strategies played by the
opponent’s eigentypes:
s∗1
(
θ1iM
)
= arg max
s′
1
.∈S
∑
θ2
iM
p
(
θ2iM
∣∣ θ2)uiM (s′1, s∗2 (θ2iM ) , (θ1iM , θ2iM)) for all θ1iM
and similarly for player 2.
ii. A corresponding profile of resulting types, one for each player and each action:
∣∣ tt=11 ∣∣ a1〉 = ∑
iM ;s
∗
1(θ1iM)=a1
λiM√∑
jM 6=iM λ
2
jM
(
s∗1
(
θ1jM
)
= a1
) ∣∣θiM ; s∗1 (θ1iM) = a1〉
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similarly for
∣∣θt=11 ∣∣ a2〉 , ∣∣θt=12 ∣∣ a1〉 and ∣∣θt=12 ∣∣ a2〉 .
For concreteness we shall now solve for the TI-equilibrium of this game in a numerical example. Suppose
the initial types are
|t1〉 =
√
.7 |θ1〉+
√
.2 |θ2〉+
√
.1 |θ3〉 , (3)
|t2〉 =
√
.2 |θ1〉+
√
.6 |θ2〉+
√
.2 |θ3〉 . (4)
Given the payoff matrices above, the threshold probability q that rationalizes the play of C for the
eigentype θ2 is q = .666. For the ease of presentation, we let q = .7. We know that the θ2 of player 2
cooperates since λ21 = .7 ≥ q and so does the θ2 of player 1 since γ21+γ22 = .8 > q.
In the TI-equilibrium of this game player 1 plays C with probability .9 and collapses on |t′1〉 =√
.7√
.7+.2
|θ1〉+
√
.2√
.7+..2
|θ2〉 and with probability .1 player 1 plays D and collapses on |θ3〉 . Player 2 plays C
with probability .8 and collapses on |t′2〉 =
√
.4√
.4+.4
|θ1〉 +
√
.4√
.4+.4
|θ2〉 and with probability .2, he plays D
and collapses on |θ3〉 .
We note that the mixture actually played by player 1 (.9C, .1D) is not the best reply of any of his
eigentypes. The same holds for player 2. The eigentypes are the ”real players” and they play pure
strategies.
We end this section with a comparison of the TI-game approach with the standard incomplete infor-
mation treatment of this game where the square of the coefficients of superposition in (1) and (2) are
interpreted as players’ beliefs about each other. The sole substantial distinction is that in the Bayes-
Harsanyi setting the players privately learn their own type before playing while in the TI-model they
learn it in the process of playing. A player is thus in the same informational situation as his opponent
with respect to his own play. However under our assumption that all the reasoning is done by the eigen-
types, the classical approach and the TI-approach are indistinguishable. They yield the same equilibrium
outcome. The distinctions are merely interpretational.
Statement 1
The equilibrium predictions TI-model of a simultaneous one-move game are the same as those of the
corresponding Bayes-Harsanyi model.
A formal proof of Statement 1 can be found in our companion paper ”TI-game 2”.
This central equivalence result should be seen as an achievement which provides support for the
hypotheses that we make to extend the basic TI-model to strategic decision-making. Indeed, we do want
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the non-classical model to deliver the same outcome in a simultaneous one-move context.16 We next move
to a setting where one of the players is involved in a sequence of moves. This is the simplest setting in
which to introduce the novelty brought about by the type indeterminacy hypothesis.
2.2 A multi-stage TI-game
In this section we introduce a new interaction involving player 1 and a third player, a promise exchange
game.17 We assume that the GS representing the promise game do not commute with the GS representing
the gameM (described in the previous section).18 Player 1 and 3 play a promise game where they choose
between either making a non-binding promise to cooperate with each other in game M or withholding
from making such a promise. Our objective is to show that playing a promise exchange game - with
a third player - can increase the probability for cooperation (decrease the probability for defection)
between the player 1 and 2 in a next following game M. Such an impact of cheap-talk promises is related
to experimental evidence reported in Frank (1988)
We shall compare two situations called respectively protocol I and II. In protocol 1 player 1 and 2
play game M. In protocol II we add a third player, 3, and we have the following sequence of events:
step 1 Player player 1 and 3 play a promises exchange game N , described below.
step 2 Player 1 and 2 play M .
step 3 Player 1 and 3 play M .19
The promise exchange game
At step 1, player 1 and 3 have to simultaneously select one of the two announcements: ”I promise to
play cooperate”, denoted, P, and ”I do not promise to play cooperate” denoted no − P . The promises
are cheap-talk i.e., breaking them in the next following games has no implications for the payoffs i.e., at
step 2 or step 3.
There exists three eigentypes in the promise exchange game:
τ1 : prefers to never make cheap-talk promises - let him be called the ”honest type”;
16We know that quantum indeterminacy cannot be distinguished from incomplete information in the case of a single
measurement. A simultaneous one-move game corresponds to two single measurements performed on two non-entangled
systems.
17The reason for introducing a third player is that we want to avoid any form of signaling. The exercise could be done
with only two players but the comparison between the classical and the TI-model would be less transparent.
18To each game we associate a collection of GS each of which measures the best reply a possible type of the opponent.
19The reason why we have the interaction at step 3 is essentially to motivate the promise exchange game. Our main
interest will focus on the interaction at step 2.
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τ2 : prefers to make a promise to cooperate if he believes the opponent cooperates with probability
p ≥ q (in which case he cooperates whenever he is of type θ2 or θ1 or any superposition of the 2).Otherwise
he makes no promises - let him be called the ”sincere type”;
τ3 : prefers to promise that he will cooperate whatever he intends to do - he can be viewed as the
”opportunistic type”.
Information assumptions
We make the following assumptions about players’ information in the multi-stage game:
i. All players know the statistical correlations (conditional probabilities) between the eigentypes of
the two (non-commuting) games.20
ii. At step 2, player 2 knows that player 1 has interacted with player 3 but he does not know the
outcome of the interaction.
We note that ii. implies that we are not dealing with an issue of strategic communication between
player 1 and 2. No message is being received by player 2.
The classical model
We first establish that in the classical setting we have the same outcome in protocol I and at step 2 of
protocol II. We already know from Statement 1 that the predictions of a TI model of game M are the
same as the prediction of the classical Bayes-Harsanyi model of the corresponding incomplete information
game.
We investigate in turn how the interaction between player 1 and 3 at step 1 affects the incentives
and/or the information of player 1 and 2 at step 2. Let us first consider the case of player 1. In a classical
setting, player 1 knows his own type, so he learns nothing from the promise exchange stage. Moreover
the announcement he makes is not payoff relevant to his interaction with player 2. So the promise game
has no direct implication for his play with player 2. As to player 2, the question is whether he has
reason to update his beliefs about player 1. Initially he knows |t1〉 from which he derives his beliefs
about player 1’s equilibrium play in game M . By our informational assumption (i) he also knows the
statistical correlations between the eigentypes of the two games from which he can derive the expected
play conditional on the choice at the promise stage. He can write the probability of e.g., the play of D
using the conditional probability formula:
p (D) = p (P ) p (D|P ) + p (no− P ) p (D|no− P ) . (5)
20So in particular they can compute the correlation between the plays in the different games.
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He knows that player 1 interacted with 3 but he does not know the outcome of the interaction. Therefore
he has no new element from which to update his information about player 1. We conclude that the
introduction of the interaction with player 3 at step 1 leaves the payoffs and the information in the game
M unchanged. Hence, expected behavior at step 2 of protocol II is the same as in protocol I.
The TI-model
Recall that the GS representing the promise game do not commute with the GS representing the gameM .
We now write eq.(1) and (2) in terms of the eigentypes of game N, i.e., of the promise stage eigentypes:
|t1〉 = λ′1 |τ1〉+ λ′2 |τ2〉+ λ′3 |τ3〉 and |t3〉 = γ′1 |τ1〉+ γ′2 |τ2〉+ γ′3 |τ3〉 .
Each one of the N−eigentype can in turn be expressed in terms of the eigentypes of game M :
|τ1〉 = δ11 |θ1〉+ δ12 |θ2〉+ δ13 |θ3〉 (6)
|τ2〉 = δ21 |θ1〉+ δ22 |θ2〉+ δ23 |θ3〉
|τ3〉 = δ31 |θ1〉+ δ32 |θ2〉+ δ33 |θ3〉
where the δij are the elements of the basis transformation matrix.
21 Assume that player 3 is (initially)
of type θ3 with probability close to 1, we say he is a ”tough” type. We shall investigate the choice of
between P and no-P of player 1 i.e., the best response of the eigentypes τ i of player 1.
By definition of the τ i type, we have that τ1 always plays no-P and τ3 always play P. Now by
assumption, player 3 is of type θ3 who never cooperates. Therefore, by the definition of τ2, player 1 of
type τ2 chooses not to promise to cooperate, he plays no−P .
This means that at step 1 with probability λ′21 + λ
′2
2 player 1 plays no−P and collapses on
∣∣t̂1〉 =
λ′
1q
(λ2′1 +λ2′2 )
|τ1〉+ λ
′
2q
(λ2′1 +λ2′2 )
|τ2〉 . With probability λ′23 he collapses on |τ3〉 .
We shall next compare player 1’s propensity to defect in protocol I with that propensity in protocol
II. For simplicity we shall assume the following correlations: δ13 = δ31 = 0, meaning that the honest
type τ1, never systematically defects and that the opportunistic guy τ3 never systematically cooperates.
Player 1’s propensity to defect in protocol I
21A basis transformation matrix links the eigentypes of the two GO M and N :
0
BBB@
〈τ1| θ1〉 = δ11 〈τ1| θ2〉 = δ12 〈τ1| θ3〉 = δ13
〈τ2| θ1〉 = δ21 〈τ2| θ2〉 = δ22 〈τ2| θ3〉 = δ23
〈τ3| θ1〉 = δ31 〈τ3| θ2〉 = δ32 〈τ3| θ3〉 = δ33
1
CCCA .
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We shall consider the same numerical example as before i.e., given by (3) and (4) so in particular we
know that θ2 of player 1 cooperates so p (D ||t1〉 ) = λ23. But our objective in this section is to account
for the indeterminacy due to the fact that in protocol I the promise game is not played. We have
|t1〉 = λ′1 |τ1〉+ λ′2 |τ2〉+ λ′3 |τ3〉 ,
using the formulas in (6) we substitute for the |τ i〉
|t1〉 = λ′1 (δ11 |θ1〉+ δ12 |θ2〉+ δ13 |θ3〉) + λ′2 (δ21 |θ1〉+ δ22 |θ2〉+ δ23 |θ3〉)
+λ′3 (δ31 |θ1〉+ δ32 |θ2〉+ δ33 |θ3〉) .
Collecting the terms we obtain
|t1〉 =
(
λ′1δ11 + λ
′
2δ21 + λ
′
3δ31
) |θ1〉+ (λ′1δ12 + λ′2δ22 + λ′3δ32) |θ2〉+(
λ′13δ + λ
′
2δ23 + λ
′
3δ33
) |θ3〉 .
We know from the preceding section that both |θ1〉 and |θ2〉 choose to cooperate so
p (D ||t1〉 ) = p (|θ3〉 ||t1〉 ) .
Using δ13 = 0, we obtain the probability for player 1’s defection in protocol I:
p (D ||t1〉 )M =
(
λ′2δ23 + λ
′
3δ33
)2
= λ2′2 δ
2
23 + λ
2′
3 δ
2
33 + 2λ
′
2δ23λ
′
3δ33. (7)
Player 1’s propensity to defect in protocol II
When the promise game is being played, i.e., the measurement N is performed, we can (as in the
classical setting) use the conditional probability formula to compute the probability for the play of D
p (D ||t1〉 )MN = p (P ) p (D|P ) + p (no− P ) p (D|no− P ) . (8)
Let us consider the first term: p (P ) p (D|P ) .We know that p (P ) = p (|τ3〉) = λ2′3 .We are now interested
in p (D|P ) or p (D |τ3〉) . |τ3〉 writes as a superposition of the θi with θ1 who never defects, θ3 who always
defect while θ2’s propensity to defect depends on what he expects player 2 to do. We cannot take for
granted that player 2 will play in protocol II as he plays in protocol I. Instead we assume for now that
eigentype θ2 of player 2 chooses to cooperate (as in protocol I) because he expects player 1’s propensity
to cooperate to be no less than in protocol I. We below characterize the case when this expectation is
correct. Now if θ2 of player 2 chooses to cooperate so does θ2 of player 1 and p (D |τ3〉) = δ233 so
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p (P ) p (D|P ) = λ2′3 δ233
We next consider the second term of (8). The probability p (no− P ) is (λ2′1 + λ2′2 ) and the type of player
1 changes, he collapses on
∣∣t̂1〉 = λ′1q
(λ2′1 +λ2′2 )
|τ1〉 + λ
′
2q
(λ2′1 +λ2′2 )
|τ2〉. Since we consider a case when θ2 of
player 1 cooperates, the probability for defection of type
∣∣t̂1〉 is
(
λ′
1q
(λ2′1 +λ2′2 )
)2
δ213 +
(
λ′
2q
(λ2′1 +λ2′2 )
)2
δ223.
Recalling that δ13 = 0, we obtain that p (no− P ) p (D|no− P ) is equal to
(
λ2′1 + λ
2′
2
) λ′2√(
λ2′1 + λ
2′
2
)
2 δ223 = λ2′2 δ223
which gives
p (D ||t1〉 )MN = λ2′2 δ223 + λ2′3 δ233. (9)
Comparing formulas in (7) and (9) :
p (D ||t1〉 )MN − p (D ||t1〉 )M = −2λ′2δ23λ′3δ33 (10)
which can be negative or positive because the interference terms only involves amplitudes of probability
i.e., the square roots of probabilities. The probability to play defect decreases (and thus the probability
for cooperation increases) when player 1 plays a promise stage whenever 2λ′2δ23λ
′
3δ33 < 0. In that case
the expectations of player 2 are correct and we have that the θ2 type of both players cooperate which we
assumed in our calculation above.22
Result 1: When player 1 meets a tough player 3 at step 1, the probability for playing defect in the
next following M game is not the same as in the M game alone, p (D ||t1〉 )M − p (D ||t1〉 )MN 6= 0.
It is interesting to note that p (D ||t1〉 )MN is the same as in the classical case. It can be obtained
from the same conditional probability formula.
In order to better understand our Result 1, we now consider a case when player 1 meets with a ”soft”
player 3, i.e., a θ1 type, at step 1.
The soft player 3 case
In this section we show that if the promise stage is an interaction with a soft player 3 there is no effect
of the promise stage on player 1’s propensity to defect and thus no effect on the interaction at step 2.
22For the case the best reply of the θ2 types changes with the performence of the promise game, the comparison between
the two protocols is less straightforward.
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Assume that player 3 is (initially) of type θ1 with probability close to 1. What is the best reply of
the N -eigentypes of player 1, i.e., how do they choose between P and no-P? By definition we have that
τ1 always plays no-P and τ3 always play P. Now by the assumption we just made player 3 is of type θ1
who always cooperates so player 1 of type τ2 chooses to promise to cooperate, he plays P .
This means that at t=1 with probability λ′21 he collapses on |τ1〉 and with probability λ′22 +λ′23 player
1 plays P and collapses on
∣∣t̂1〉 = λ′2√
λ2′
2
+λ2′
3
|τ2〉 + λ
′
3√
λ2′
2
+λ2′
3
|τ3〉 . We shall compute the probability to
defect of that type.23 We write the type vector
∣∣t̂1〉 in terms of the M -eigentypes,
∣∣t̂1〉 =
 λ′2√
λ′22 + λ
′2
3
 (δ21 |θ1〉+ δ22 |θ2〉+ δ23 |θ3〉)
+
 λ′3√
λ′22 + λ′23
 (δ31 |θ1〉+ δ32 |θ2〉+ δ33 |θ3〉)
As we investigate player 1’s M -eigentypes’ best reply, we again have to make an assumption about player
2’s expectation. And the assumption we make is that he believes that player 1’s propensity to defect is
unchanged, so as in protocol I the θ2 of both players cooperate and only θ3 defects. We have
p
(
D
∣∣∣∣t̂1〉)MN =
 λ′2√
λ′22 + λ
′2
3
δ23 +
λ′3√
λ′22 + λ
′2
3
δ33
2
p
(
D
∣∣∣∣t̂1〉)MN = 1λ2′2 + λ2′3 [λ′22δ223 + λ′23δ233 + 2λ′2λ′3δ23δ33]
The probability for defection is thus
p (D ||t1〉 )MN = P (τ1) p (D ||τ1〉 ) + P
(
t̂1
)
p
(
D
∣∣∣∣t̂1〉) =
0 +
(
λ2′2 + λ
2′
3
) 1
λ2′2 + λ
2′
3
[
λ2′2 δ
2
23 + λ
2′
3 δ
2
33 + 2λ
′
2λ
′
3δ23δ33
]
= λ2′2 δ
2
23 + λ
2′
3 δ
2
33 + 2λ
′
2λ
′
3δ23δ33.
Comparing with eq. (7) of protocol I we see that here
p (D ||t1〉 )M = p (D ||t1〉 )MN
There is NO effect of the promise stage. This is because the interference terms are still present. We note
also that player 2 was correct in his expectation about player 1’s propensity to defect.
Result 2
If player 1’s move at step 1 does not separate between the N-eigentypes that would otherwise interfere
in the determination of his play of D at step 2 then p (D ||t1〉 )M = p (D ||t1〉 )MN .
23Recall that τ1 never defects.
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Let us try to provide an intuition for our two results. In the absence of a promise stage (protocol I) both
the sincere and opportunistic type coexist in the mind of player 1. Both these two types have a positive
propensity to defect. When they coexist they interfere positively(negatively) to reinforce(weaken) player
1’s propensity to defect. When playing the promise exchange game the two types may either separate
or not. They separate in the case of a tough player 3. Player 1 collapses either on a superposition of
the honest and sincere type (and chooses no-P) or on the opportunistic type (and chooses P). Since the
sincere and the opportunistic types are separated (by the first measurement, game N) there is no more
interference. In the case of a soft player 3 case, the play of the promise game does not separate the sincere
from the opportunistic guy, they both prefer P. As a consequence the two N eigentypes interfere in the
determination of outcome of the next following M game as they do in protocol I.
In this example we demonstrated that in a TI-model of strategic interaction, a promise stage does
make a difference for players’ behavior in the next following performance of game M. The promise stage
makes a difference because it may destroy interference effects that are present in protocol I.
Quite remarkably the distinction between the predictions of the classical and the TI-game only appears
in the absence of the play of a promise stage (with a tough player). Indeed the probability formula that
applies in the TI-model for the case the agent undergoes the promise stage (9) is the same as the
conditional probability formula that applies in the standard classical setting.
The cheap-talk promise paradox
When promises that have no commitment or informational value affect behavior, we may speak about
a cheap talk paradox (with respect to established theory). In particular we may have the case that despite
the fact that all types pool to make cheap-talk promises (we only have non-revealing equilibria), they
nevertheless affect subsequent play. Our paper does not exactly address this case. This is because on
the one hand playing the promise game always separates between the τ1 and τ3. On the other hand the
promises are not communicated to player 2. Yet, because the analysis focuses on the separation between
τ2 and τ3 (and by its information assumption avoids Bayesian updating with respect to τ1), it suggests
two possible explanations for why cheap talk promises may matter:
1. Unobserved separation
Here the idea is that the promise game actually does trigger separation between types (like in protocol
2 with a taught type). Reaching the promise response is more difficult for the reciprocating type τ2
than for the opportunistic τ3. It takes longer time to do the reasoning. The act of playing breaks the
indeterminacy of player 1 but that is not observed by player 2, both τ2 and τ3 choose to promise or they
choose differently but player 2 does not learn about it. In that case the TI-model’s predictions in the
15
next following PD game with or without a prior promise exchange game are not the same. We have an
impact of cheap-talk promises.
2. Observed pooling
The second line of explanation of the paradox follows a different logic. It relies on the observation
that if the observer has the classical model in mind, his predictions are incorrect. When he confronts his
predictions in protocol 2 (which are the same as his predictions in protocol 1) with the actual outcome of
protocol 2, he notes a difference. This is because simply he did not account for the interference effects.
So here the explanation is not that pooling in cheap-talk promises changes behavior but that there is an
error in the modeling of the pooling outcome.
Possible fields of application of TI-games
We have learned from this explorative example that TI-games may bring forth new results in the context
of multi-stage game or when a game is preceded by some form of ”pre-play”. We conjecture that the
Type Indeterminacy approach may bring new light on the following issues:
- Players’ choice of selection principle in multiple equilibria situation;
In Camerer ?? the author reports about experiments where a pre-play auction impacts on the principle
of selection among multiple equilibria in a coordination game. The pre-play auction for the right to play
the coordination game tended to push toward the payoff-dominant equilibrium compared with the no pre-
play case. In a TI-game, preferences with respect to the equilibrium selection criteria can be modified by
pre-play.
- The selection of a reference point;
According to experiments (see ) playing a contest before an ultimatum game can affect the equilibrium
offer and acceptance threshold. In a TI-game the pre-play of a contest may change the preferences of the
players with respect to what they feel entitled to in an ultimatum game played next.
- The sunk cost fallacy;
According to numerous experiments and casual evidence people seem to be the victims of the sunk
cost fallacy. In an experiment, people who were offered a year subscription to the theater showed (on
average) a greater propensity to go to the theater than people who were not offered subscription. In a
TI-game the pre-play decision to purchase a subscription may modify people’s valuation of theater plays.
- Path-dependency;
A single (little probable) move which radically modifies the type of a player can yield significative
implications for the path of future play.
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3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored an extension of the Type Indeterminacy model of decision-making to
strategic decision-making in a maximal information context. We did that by means of an example of a
2X2 game that we investigate in two different settings. In the first setting the game is played directly.
In the second setting the game is preceded by a promise exchange game. We first find that in a one-shot
setting the predictions of the TI-model are the same as those of the corresponding Bayes-Harsanyi game
of incomplete information. This is no longer true in the multiple move setting. We give an example
of circumstances under which the predictions of the two models are not the same. We show that the
TI-model can provide an explanation for why a cheap-talk promises matter. The promise game may
separate between potential eigentypes and thereby destroy interference effects that otherwise contribute
to the determination of, e.g., the propensity to defect in the next following game.
Last we want to emphasize the very explorative character of this paper. A companion paper TI-game
2 develops the basic concepts and solutions of TI-games. We believe that this avenue of research has a
rich potential to explain a variety of puzzles in (sequential) interactive situations and to give new impulses
to game theory.
References
[1] Busemeyer J.R., Wang, Z. and Townsend J.T. (2006) ”Quantum Dynamics of Human Decision-
Making” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 50, 220-241.
[2] Busemeyer J. R. (2007) ”Quantum Information Processing Explanation for Interaction between
Inferences and Decisions.” Proceedings of the Quantum Interaction Symposium AAAI Press.
[3] Busemeyer, J.R. Matthew, M., and Wang Z. (2006) ”An information processing explanation of the
Disjunction effect”. In Sun and Miyake (Eds), 131-135.
[4] Camerer C. F., (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press.
[5] Busemeyer JR, Santuy E. ant A. Lambert-Mogiliansky (2008) ”Distinguishing quantum and Markov
models of human decision making” in Proceedings of the the second interaction symposium (QI
2008), 68-75.
[6] Danilov V. I. and A. Lambert-Mogiliansky (2008) ”Measurable Systems and Behavioral Sciences”.
Mathematical Social Sciences 55, 315-340.
17
[7] Danilov V. I. and A. Lambert-Mogiliansky. (2008) ”Decision-making under non-classical uncertainty”
in Proceedings of the the second interaction symposium (QI 2008), 83-87.
[8] Deutsch D. (1999) ”Quantum Theory of Propability and Decisions”. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 455,
3129-3137.
[9] Eisert J., M. Wilkens and M. Lewenstein (1999), “Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies” Phys.
Rev. Lett. 83, 3077.
[10] Franco R., (2007) ”The conjunction Fallacy and Interference Effects” arXiv:0708.3948v1
[11] Franco R. (2008) ” The inverse fallacy and quantum formalism” in Proceedings of the the second
interaction symposium (QI 2008), 94-98.
[12] Frank H. R. 1988, Passion within Reason, W.W. Norton & company, New York - London
[13] Fudenberg D. and D.. Levine (2006) ”A Dual Self Model of Impuls Control” American Economic
Review 96 (2006) 1446-1476.
[14] Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole (1991) Game Theory, MIT Press.
[15] Khrennikov A. Yu (2007) ”A Model of Quantum-like decision-making with application to psychology
and Cognitive Sciences” http://arhiv.org/abs/0711.1366
[16] Koesller F. et F. Forges 2008 ” Transmission Strategique de l’Information et Certification” Annales
d’Economie et de Statistiques.
[17] Lambert-Mogiliansky A., S. Zamir, and H. Zwirn. (2007) ”Type-indeterminacy - A Model for the KT-
(Kahneman and Tversky)-man”, available on ArXiv:physics/0604166 forthcoming in the Journal of
Mathematical Psychology 2009.
[18] La Mura P. (2003) ”Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals” Game
Theory and Information 0309001 EconWPA.
[19] La Mura P. (2005) ”Decision Theory in the Presence of Risk and Uncertainty”. mimeo. Leipzig
Graduate School of Business.
[20] La Mura P. (2008) ”Prospective expected utility” in Proceedings of the the second interaction sym-
posium (QI 2008), 87-94.
[21] R.H. Strotz (1956) ”Myopya and Time Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization” Review of
Economic Studies Vol 23/3 165-180.
18
